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Every worldview has an explanation for the presence of evil. Some worldviews 
can explain evil easier than others. Many eastern perspectives explain the existence of 
evil in terms of a cause and effect system known as Karma. Every instance of evil that an 
individual may encounter during his or her lifetime is a direct result of some action or 
nonaction that was or was not performed in the past. On the other hand, the monotheistic 
worldview has a much more difficult time than the eastern worldview. The monotheistic 
position must defend the belief that an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God exists, even 
in light ofthe obvious evils that have found a home here on earth. The following is a brief 
ŤŸŮŨŬŲŠWÙŬŪĚof the problem of evil within monotheism as presented in its two forms: the 
logical problem of evil and the evidential problem of evil. I will examine the strengths 
and weaknesses of various monotheistic responses to the problem . 
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"Therefore shall evil come upon thee; thou shalt not know from whence it riseth: and 
mischief shall fall upon thee; thou shalt not be able to put it off: and desolation shall 
come upon thee suddenly, which thou shalt not know" (Isaiah 47: 11, KN). 
Evil. Whether it is in the form of an unwarranted parking ticket, or the news of a 
premature death of a close friend, it affects us all. The question becomes, how do we deal 
with it? Is there a reason why the innocent suffer? How can Theism propose that an all-
loving and all-powerful God exists when His own people are pointlessly destroyed? 
This, in short, is the problem of evil: How can there be an actively involved, omnipotent, 
and omnibenevolent God when His creation is plagued with evil? Critics argue that this 
world is not what we might expect from an all-powerful, all-loving God. Surely, ifhe did 
exist, He could have done a better job. The problem of evil has been so persuasive that 
the German Theologian Hans Kung has called it the "rock of atheism." Through theistic 
suppositions and the free will defense, the following is an attempt to show that the 
existence of an omnipotent and wholly good God can both logically and plausibly coexist 
with the presence of evil. 
--
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Yankel Wiemik, a carpenter and survivor of the Holocaust recalls: 
Between 450 and 500 persons were crowded into a chamber measuring 
125 square feet in Treblinka. Parents carried their children in the vain hope 
of saving them from death. On the way to their doom they were pushed 
and beaten with rifle butts and gas pipes. Dogs were set on them, barking, 
biting and tearing them. It lasted a short while. Then the doors were shut 
tightly with a bang. Twenty-five minutes later everybody was dead and 
they stood lifeless; there being no free space, they just leaned against each 
other. They no longer shouted because the thread of their lives had been 
broken. They no longer had any needs or desires. Mothers held their 
children tightly in their arms. There were no more friends, no more 
enemies. There was no jealousy. All were equal. There was no longer 
any beauty or ugliness, for all looked yellow from the gas. There were no 
longer any rich or poor. All were equal. And why all this? That is the 
question I keep asking myself. My life is hard, very hard. I must live to 
tell the world about this (Wiesel et al. Dimensions 14-15). 
Another chilling affair giving credence to the very real presence of evil that 
mankind both creates, and is exposed to, is recalled by another Holocaust victim upon his 
arrival at a concentration camp: 
Never shall I forget that night, the first night in camp, which has turned 
my ŨÙJȚÙŸĚ into one long night, seven times sealed. Never shall I forget that 
smoke. Never shall I forget the little faces of the children, whose bodies I 
saw turned to wreaths of smoke beneath a silent blue sky. Never shall I 
forget those flames which consumed my faith forever. Never shall I forget 
the nocturnal silence which deprived me, for all eternity, of the desire to 
live. Never shall I forget those moments which murdered my God and my 
soul and turned my dreams to dust. Never shall I forget these things, even 
if I am condemned to live as long as God Himself. Never (Wiesel Night 
43-44). 
The existence of evil has long been used by many to discredit the claims of the 
Theist. The most impressive ofthe claims against theism is known as the problem of 
evil. Many suggest that the existence of evil makes the belief in God unreasonable or 
rationally unacceptable. The theologian Eugine Borowitz explicates: 
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Any God who could permit the Holocaust, who could remain silent during 
it, who could "hide His face" while it dragged on, was not worth believing 
in. There might well be a limit to how much we could understand about 
Him, but Auschwitz demanded an unreasonable suspension of 
understanding. In the face of such great evil, God, the good and the 
powerful, was too inexplicable, so men said "God is dead" (Borowitz 99). 
DEFINING EVIL 
When discussion of the problem of evil arises, it is wise to first start with a precise 
definition of what evil is. The need for a precise definition of evil may initially sound 
witless, but as we proceed, we will find great utility in having a similar conception of evil 
as our starting point. This, however, can be an arduous task. When defining evil, it is 
easy to bring one's own presuppositions or first-principles to the table, thus, hindering the 
objective goal of defining evil. Most individuals, when questioned about evil, would 
more or less agree to a set of circumstances where the term evil applies. However, these 
same individuals might disagree as to what the term evil implies. For example, most 
people agree that the actions of the "final solution" instituted by Nazi Germany were evil; 
however, whether those same actions constitute as "sin," or "rebellion against God" is 
highly debatable. Considering this, I will proceed with a non suggestive, commonsense 
notion of evil, free of religious influence. For our purposes, evil will be recognized as 
extreme pain ,md suffering, physical deformities, psychological abnormalities, the 
prosperity of bad men, the demise of good men, the disruption of social relations, 
unfulfilled potential, a host of character defects, and natural catastrophes. 
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AS AN INTERNAL PROBLEM 
The problem of evil is an internal problem for the Theist. Many theistic defenses 
have failed miserably because the defender utilized only the information provided to them 
by the attackers. This method of defense is not only limited, but it is also absurd. 
Because the problem of evil is a theistic problem, the Theist should, and certainly has the 
right to, explore the full scope of theistic suppositions in solving or defending the 
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problem. It is from this internal perspective that I will concentrate my efforts in 
exploring this internal quandary. 
THE PROBLEM 
So, what then shall we say the problem of evil is? H.J. McCloskey stated the 
riddle in the following way, "There is evil in the world; yet the world is said to be the 
creation of a good and omnipotent God. How is this possible? Surely a good and 
omnipotent God would have made a world free of evil of any kind" (McCloskey 187). 
For the sake of both clarity and utility, I will condense the problem of evil into two 
proposi tions: 
(1) God is omnipotent and wholly good 
(2) Evil exists. 
The problem presented is clear. If God is omnipotent, meaning all-powerful, He should 
be able to eliminate all forms of evil. Also, if God is omnibenevolent, meaning all-good 
and all-loving, He would want to eliminate all forms of evil. Yet, evil does exist. The 
conclusion then is easy. Since evil exists, either God is not omnipotent and 
omnibenevolent, or He doesn't exist at all. This, then, is what we will consider when 
discussing the suggested problem of evil. 
Critical attacks on theism generally follow one or two different veins of attack: 
the logical problem of evil, and/or the evidential problem of evil. I will discuss both at 
length starting first with the logical problem of evil. 
THE LOGICAL PROBLEM OF EVIL 
John Mackie (1917-1981), a well known critic of theism, states in his Evil and 
Omnipotence the logical problem of evil, "God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; yet, 
evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these propositions, so that if 
any two of them were true the third would be false" (Mackie 92). What Mackie is 
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asserting in this quotation can be stated in a number of different ways. This is one 
possibility: If God is omnipotent, and if God is wholly good, evil should not exist. A 
second possibility: If evil exists, and if God is omnipotent, God cannot be wholly good. A 
third alternative to Mackie's claim: If God is wholly good, and if evil exists, God cannot 
be omnipotent. Mackie's charge against theism correctly asserts the three beliefs that God 
is omnipotent, God is wholly good, and that evil exists. These are essential foundations 
for most theistic positions. Mackie's next move is to demand that one ofthese premises 
be dropped for the sake oflogical consistency. "But at the same time," Mackie asserts, 
"all three are essential parts of most theological positions; the theologian, it seems, at 
once must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three" (Mackie 92-93). The 
demand, then_ of the atheist or atheologian, is that the Theist must either drop the premise 
that God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent, or the premise that evil exists. Although 
this problem is known by various names such as the deductive problem or the a priori 
problem, the common element is the charge that theism involves an inconsistent set of 
beliefs concerning God and evil, and that the Theist is unwarranted in believing them. 
The role then of the theist defender is to show that the existence of an omnipotent and 
omnibenevolent God is compatible with the existence of evil. 
THE EASY WAY OUT 
Some Theists, known by some as quasi theists or ethical monists, have answered 
the logical problem of evil by denying the premise that evil exists. Evil then is presented 
as an illusion or only perceived as such by man. Two notable examples are the Christian 
Scientists and some fonns of Judaism. Mary Baker Eddy, the founder of Christian 
Science, stated, "Nothing is real and eternal, -nothing is Spirit, -but God and His idea. 
Evil has no reality. It is neither person, place, nor thing, but is simply belief, an illusion 
of material sense" (Eddy 71). 
--. 
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Some followers within Judaism adhere to this same path of thinking when 
considering the existence of evil. Rabbi Yechiel Eckstein, an orthodox Jewish Rabbi, 
concedes that the question of evil has been debated among the rabbis for centuries. The 
problem that the rabbis faced was that if evil does exist, how could it have been created 
by God since all that flows from God is pure Goodness. Also, if evil does exist and God 
did not create it, that assumes the autonomous, ontological status of the devil who is a 
coequal being with God, something that Judaism rejects. How then have some adherents 
within Judaism answered this question? Rabbi Eckstein provides an answer to this 
question, "It was this dilemma that prompted many rabbis to claim that evil and Satan as 
ontological forces do not, in fact, exist, but are only perceived as such by man" (Eckstein 
67). 
This method of negating evil initially satisfies the atheists demand that the Theist 
drop one of the two logically inconsistent premises of theism. However, the quasi theist's 
proposed premise, when substituted for the removed premise, is neither satisfactory to 
most theists nor atheists. This approach to evil, or rather non-approach to evil, has long 
been regarded by scholars as an easy escape route to a difficult problem. Winfried 
Corduan, a theistic philosopher, argues that the problems with evil as an illusion are 
manifold. Corduan attacks the "evil as illusion" position by granting first, the truth of the 
premise, that evil is an illusion, and second, by showing the logical absurdity of accepting 
such a premise. If evil is an illusion, Corduan argues, what is the status of the illusion? Is 
the illusion good or bad? Those who promote the "evil as an illusion" argument tell us 
that we need to get beyond the illusion because clinging to such an illusion will cause us 
pain. Corduan responds to this warning by showing the logical inconsistency within the 
position, "Then the illusion itself is evil, and there is an obj ective standard of good and 
evil after all. Calling evil an illusion briefly postpones the problem, but we still have to 
deal with the fact that we are beset by an evil illusion" (Corduan 130). 
--
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Because of the internal problems found within the quasi theist's proposition that 
evil does not exist, we will now concentrate our efforts utilizing the traditional evil-
acknowledging rendition oftheism in solving the logical problem of evil. 
A REBUTTAL 
It is widely recognized among critics and defenders of theism that the premise that 
God is omnipotent and wholly good (1), does not necessarily imply that evil cannot exist 
(-2). If there is a contradiction here, it is implicit rather than explicit. What the critic 
must provide then is a third proposition concerning premise (1) or (2) that would make 
the three propositions an explicitly contradictory set. Seeking to create an explicitly 
contradictory argument, lL. Mackie proposes that, "These additional principles are that 
good is opposed to evil, in such a way that a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it 
can, and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do" (Mackie 93). 
Mackie's additional premises providing for an explicit contradicting set can be stated as 
follows: 
(la) A good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can 
(lb) There are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do. 
No theistic philosopher has done as much damage to the atheists claim of 
inconsistency than Alvin C. Plantinga (1932-). Plantinga, in his work God, Freedom, and 
Evil, responds to both propositions (1a) and (lb) as presented by Mackie. The first step 
Plantinga take:s in refuting Mackie's claims is to question Mackie's interpretation of the 
term omnipotence. Plantinga rightfully asserts that the term omnipotence does not mean 
that there are no limits to what the omnipotent being can do. What does it mean, then, to 
say that God is omnipotent? The natural response is to say that He is all-powerful or 
almighty; there is nothing that God cannot do. But does this make sense? Plantinga asks 
the question, can God create square circles, for example, or married bachelors? Plantinga 
--
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asserts that there are certain actions which are impossible for God to perform, "Most 
theologians and theistic philosophers, who hold that God is omnipotent, do not hold that 
he can create square circles or bring it about that he both exists and does not exist" 
(plantinga God 17-24). Plantinga further explains the term omnipotence in terms of 
there being no non-logical limits. That is, there are no non-logical limits to what an 
omnipotent being can do. Conversely, theologians and theistic philosophers do not 
believe that an omnipotent being can bring about logically impossible states of affairs or 
cause necessarily false propositions to be true. 
It is important to remember that when one proposes a claim of inconsistency 
against traditional theism, the critic is wise to suggest counter-claims using essential 
elements oftheism. The critic may very well find a set of propositions that form a logical 
inconsistency concerning theism, but doing so is inane unless the propositions are central 
to the theistic position. Mackie, then, appears to have committed this blunder in his 
proposition concerning omnipotence, and Plantinga makes short work of discrediting it. 
If it is agreed that Plantinga has discredited Mackie's claim (1 b), then we can now 
concentrate our efforts at examining Mackie's second claim concerning the actions of a 
good thing (premise la). 
Mackie's second claim is that a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can. 
Is this proposition necessarily true? Plantinga illustrates with a story of a mountain 
climber that this proposition is not necessarily true. Paraphrased, the story line flows as 
follows: A novice mountain climber suffers a painful injury to his leg while climbing a 
difficult summit. The mountain climber then calls upon his friend, a physician, to cure 
his injury, which is an evil state of affairs. The physician predicts that the injury will 
leave on its own accord given a few days rest. The physician then states that the only 
thing he could do to eliminate the pain immediately would be to amputate the leg at the. 
climber's knee. 
--
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Plantinga's point, then, is that a good thing, namely the physician, has the power 
to eliminate the evil state of affairs, the pain of the injured knee, but chooses not to. Does 
the failure of the physician to remove the evil state of affairs imply that the physician is 
no longer a good thing? Of course not. It is entirely possible that a good thing fail to 
eliminate an evil that it knows about and is capable of eliminating. The elimination ofthe 
present evil state of affairs would lead to a greater state of evil. 
Mackie might benefit from a revision of his above proposition (Ia) to state that an 
omnipotent and omniscient good being eliminates every evil that it can properly eliminate 
without bring:ing about a greater evil state of affairs (I c). If the theist grants validity to 
Mackie's revision, the set of propositions now follows as such: 
(1) God is omnipotent and wholly good 
(Ic) An omnipotent and omniscient good being eliminates every evil that 
it can properly eliminate without bringing about a greater evil state of 
affairs 
(2) Evil exists. 
Does this revision of Mackie's premise concerning the actions of a good thing solidify the 
atheistic position? Hardly. At best, this argument is still only implicitly contradictory, 
while what we seek is an explicitly contradicting set (see Lauder page 10). 
A POSSIBILITY 
From Augustine to Plantinga, the most popular rationale for God's allowance of 
evil is man's free will. The theory, simply stated, is that God gave man free will and with 
it, the possibility of doing both good and evil acts. God could not have eliminated evil 
without eliminating man's freedom; evil, then, is the unavoidable condition to make 
human free will a possibility. Plantinga states that the heart of the "Free Will Defense" 
is, "the claim that it is possible that God could not have created a universe containing 
moral good (or as much moral good as this world contains) without creating one that also 
contained moral evil. And if so, then it is possible that God has a good reason for 
creating a world containing evil" (Plantinga God 31). 
--
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When considering the "Free Will Defense", two important distinctions need to be 
noted. The first is the concept of a free action. According to the free will defender, an 
action r is a fi'ee action if and only ifthe person doing r is both free to perform r and free 
to refrain from performing r; no preceding conditions and/or causal laws determine that 
he/she will perform the action or that he/she won't perform the action. Second, the Free 
Will Defense is not an attempt to provide a Free Will Theodicy. The latter is an attempt 
to provide what God's reason is for permitting evil, while the former is an attempt to 
show what God's reason might possibly be for permitting evil. One such theodicy given 
by Augustine, an early Christian Church philosopher-theologian, argues that God has 
created a more perfect universe through the allowance of evil than He could have by 
refusing to do so. God's goodness and generosity is exhibited because He has not 
refrained from creating us; a creature that He foreknew would not only sin, but also 
remain in the will to sin. This theodicy of Augustine exhibits his great reverence for the 
gift of free will. The great worth of this gift is explicated in the following analogy: 
As a nmaway horse is better than a stone which does not run away because 
it lacks self-movement and sense perception, so the creature is more 
excellent which sins by free will than that which does not sin only because 
it has no free will ("The Problem of Free Choice" 14-15). 
According to Augustine, the best universe requires the existence of free, rational, and 
moral agents; some of which perform evil acts. However, the existence of moral evil 
performed by free creatures is much better than a universe lacking both the free creatures 
and the evil they produce. This theodicy, then, specifies the reason why God permits evil 
versus a free will defense that would offer a possible reason why God allows evil. This 
distinction between the two is important because the free will defender need not claim or 
even believe that the "Free Will Defense" proposition is true. Rather, the free will 
defender need only show that the "Free Will Defense" proposition is consistent with the 
--
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propositions (1) and (2) above. With this in mind, we can explore Plantinga's third 
proposition providing consistency between propositions (1) and (2). 
Following an Augustinian line of thinking, Plantinga asserts that a world 
containing creatures who are significantly free is more valuable than a world containing 
no free creatures at all. Now God can create free creatures, but He cannot cause or 
determine them to do only what is right. If He does so, then they are not significantly 
free after all; they do not do what is right freely. If God has created creatures capable of 
moral good, there must also be the capacity to perform moral evil; these creatures cannot 
be free to perform moral evil and at the same time be prevented from doing so. 
Following this, Plantinga suggests that God did in fact create significantly free creatures; 
but some ofthem went wrong in the exercise of freedom: this is the source of moral evil. 
What does this presence of moral evil say about the nature of God? Plantinga offers the 
following: 
That fact that these free creatures sometimes go wrong, however, counts 
neither against God's omnipotence nor against his goodness; for he could 
have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by excising the 
possibility of moral good (Plantinga The Nature 166-167). 
The free will defender's third proposition providing consistency between propositions (1) 
and (2) can be stated as follows: God, being omnipotent, chose to give man significant 
free will and could not have created a world with significantly free creatures that only 
performed moral good without the option of performing moral evil. With this in mind, 
we can now outline the "Free Will Defense" that includes proposition (la): 
(1) God is omnipotent and wholly good 
(la) God, being omnipotent, chose to give man significant free will and could not 
have created a world with significantly free creatures that only performed moral 
good without the option of performing moral evil 
(2) Evil exists. 
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The most prevalent objection to the "Free Will Defense" argues that it is logically 
possible that God, being omnipotent, could have created a world containing significantly 
free creatures that never chose to do evil. After all, if God is truly omnipotent, He could 
bring about any logical state of affairs. The typical free will response argues this 
assertion is self-contradictory. If God is to provide significant free will to man, the action 
taken by the free creature is entirely up to man and cannot be determined by God. 
Certainly it is possible that God could have made a world containing creatures that only 
performed good actions, but if God also grants man significant freedom, He cannot limit 
man's actions to only good actions. The option to do wrong must be available to the 
creature if that creature is truly free. 
Proponents of the logical problem of evil have diminished in the last two decades 
due to Plantinga's "Free Will Defense". It is widely recognized that the logical problem 
of evil has been neutralized through the "Free Will Defense". The most recent attacks on 
Theism have shifted gears and now pursue the evidential problem of evil. 
THE EVIDENTIAL PROBLEM OF EVIL 
The difference between the logical problem of evil and the evidential problem of 
evil is often seen as a subtle difference. Even so, the distinction is important. As we 
have seen in the preceding argument, the logical problem of evil asserts that it is logically 
impossible for the existence of an omnipotent and wholly good God to coexist with the 
presence of evil. The evidential problem of evil argues that the coexistence of an 
omnipotent, wholly good God and evil is implausible. The evidential problem of evil 
concerns itself not with logic, as the logical problem does, but rather with whether the 
Theist can provide a reasonable explanation that would answer the question, "Why does 
evil exist." We will soon see that the "Free Will Defense" is not only applicable to the 
logical problem of evil, but also to the evidential problem of evil. 
--
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THE THREE EVIDENTIAL ARGUMENTS 
A brief exploration of the evidential problem of evil would reveal to the inquirer 
that this particular argument against theism usually presents itself in one of three ways in 
the literature. The first argues that theism is improbable due to the sheer existence of 
evil. The second suggests theism is improbable because large amounts, extreme kinds, 
and perplexing distributions of evil exist. The third type of evidential argument suggests 
theism is improbable because gratuitous, or pointless evil, exists. We will explore each 
of these forms of the evidential argument in detail and in the order that they were 
presented. 
The evidential argument from the sheer existence of evil can be outlined as 
follows: 
(la) The existence of evil 
provides counter-evidence against the claim that 
(2) An omnipotent and wholly good God exists. 
It isn't hard to see that this form of argument has the same shortcomings as the logical 
problem of evil. The critic here is assuming that God would not allow for any form of 
evil to exist. The atheist here uses assumptions that the theist either does not or need not 
accept. As stated earlier, to properly attack a belief system, one must provide an attack 
that concerns itself with essential, internal elements of the system itself. To offer an 
attack with external positions is to reduce the disagreement to mere name calling or 
backbiting. 
Most critics agree that the mere existence of evil does not provide for a strong 
argument against theism. Instead, they focus their attention on the large amount of evil 
that exists as evidence against the belief in God. This brings us to the second type of 
evidential argument; the argument from large amounts, extreme kinds, and perplexing 
distributions of evil. The argument is summarized here: 
--
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(1 b) Because large amounts, extreme kinds, and perplexing distributions of evil 
exist, 
it is implausible to believe that 
(2) An omnipotent and wholly good God exists. 
Theists generally reply to this proposition by attacking the atheist's assumption that God 
would only allow a certain amount of evil to exist. This assumption is difficult to prove. 
It is difficult for finite beings to determine an infinite being's level of toleration 
concerning evil. Can we truly know how much evil is too much evil according to God? 
Monotheistic religions do not offer any clear limit placed upon evil by God. However, 
for a theist to deny that large amounts or extreme kinds of evil exist is not only denying 
the obvious, but is also counter-productive if dialogue between theists and nontheists is 
desired. Instead, the theist can accept the proposition that large and extreme kinds of evil 
do, in fact, exist, but they could also argue that this neither supports nor argues against 
the existence of God. Unless we can determine how much evil is too much evil 
according to God's standards, we cannot assert that the present state of large and extreme 
kinds of evil far exceed God's standard simply because we perceive it as such. 
The third and final type of evidential reasoning argues that the existence of 
gratuitous or pointless evil makes the belief in an omnipotent, wholly good God 
implausible. Outlined simply, the argument flows as follows: 
(I c) The existence of gratuitous or pointless evil 
argues against the proposition that 
(2) An omnipotent and wholly good God exists. 
This argument, as stated thus far, is only implicitly contradictory because the existence of 
an omnipotent and wholly good God does not conclusively indicate that gratuitous evil 
should not exist. Therefore, an additional assumption must be made that would imply 
that gratuitous evil cannot coexist with an omnipotent and wholly good God. The 
additional assumption that has been traditionally regarded as a sound hypothesis by both 
--
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atheists and theists alike is called meticulous providence (MP). This assumption of 
meticulous providence states the following: 
(MP) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God would prevent or 
eliminate the existence of really gratuitous or pointless evils. 
The addition of this premise (MP) now changes the argument from gratuitous evil to the 
following: 
1. If (2) is true, then, assuming that (MP) is true, (1 c) should not be true. 
2. It is probable that (Ic) is true. 
3. Therefore, it is probable that (2) is false. 
Simply stated, if God is omnipotent and wholly good and employs meticulous 
providence, gratuitous evil should not exist. It is probable that gratuitous evil does, in 
fact, exist. Therefore, God as an omnipotent and wholly good God is probably false. 
As stated above, this premise has long been accepted by theists as well as by 
atheists. What naturally follows is that the theist rejects that such gratuitous evils do 
exist. The theist will attempt to show that the apparent gratuitous evil has a purpose that 
promotes some act of good (e.g .. suffering builds character, which is good). Traditional 
theists have been met with both success and failure when utilizing this approach. Critics 
argue that the theist may be able to explain away some evils as nongratuitous, but they 
cannot succeed in explaining away all instances of apparent gratuitous evil. The critics 
provide an internal criticism oftheism based on the theistic view of man in light of God's 
creation. Theism, particularly the Judeo-Christian tradition, holds that God has created 
man with generally trustworthy, rational, and moral faculties. The critics argue that to 
deny the experiences of both laymen and philosophers that recognize various instances of 
gratuitous evil is to call into question the reliability of God's gift of rationality to man. 
Admittedly, it can be difficult to accept the proposition that no gratuitous evils 
exist. The heinous act of placing a newborn child into a garbage dumpster with the intent 
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that it will starve to death, or the slaughter of innocent Jews at the hands of the Nazi's, is 
hard to accept as promoting a greater good. 
Theodore Dreiser, an American novelist, was fascinated by the natural processes 
and their meaning. Dreiser wrote a novel based on a character named Frank 
Cowperwood that explores what seems to be a gratuitous evil. In the story, while either 
heading home from school or walking to the bank to see his father, Frank would pass by a 
fish-market which was known for a certain tank in the front of the store where certain odd 
specimens of sea-life were kept. One day, Frank saw a squid and a lobster put into the 
tank. The lobster, it appeared from the talk of the idle bystanders, was offered no food, as 
the squid was considered his rightful prey. The lobster lay at the bottom of the clear glass 
tank upon the yellow sand, apparently seeing nothing, for no one could tell in which way 
his beady, black buttons of eyes were looking. Apparently its eyes were never offthe 
body of the squid. The squid, pale and waxy in texture, looking very much like pork fat 
or jade, moved about the tank in torpedo fashion, but his movements were never out of 
the sight of his enemy, for by degrees, small portions ofthe squid's body began to 
disappear, snapped off by the claws of the lobster. The lobster would leap to where the 
squid was apparently idly dreaming, and the squid would dart away, shooting out a cloud 
of black ink, behind which it would disappear. However, this was not always successful. 
Small portions of the squid's body and tail were frequently left in the claws of the lobster 
below. Frank was so fascinated by this drama that he would return to the fish-market 
daily to watch. One morning, Frank stood in front of the tank with his nose pressed to the 
glass. He saw that only a portion of the squid remained, and his ink-bag was near empty. 
In the corner of the tank sat the monster poised for action. Dreiser continues the story: 
The boy stayed as long as he could, the bitter struggle fascinating 
him. Now, maybe, or in an hour or a day, the squid might die, slain by the 
lobster, and the lobster would eat him. He looked again at the greenish-
copperish engine of destruction in the corner and wondered when this 
would be (Dreiser 10-13). 
--
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Although this particular instance of evil is connected with the animal world, the 
human world is not immune to similar instances of gratuitous evil. The theist, then, is 
presented with numerous options concerning gratuitous evil. The question becomes, 
"How can theism deal with what appears to be pointless evil?" One option is to continue 
to deny that gratuitous evils exist, which we noted early has resulted in widespread 
disapproval. Another option, which has been pursued by many contemporary theists, is 
to accept the overwhelming evidence that gratuitous evil exists. The result of this 
acceptance of gratuitous evil is the denial of the premise we earlier called meticulous 
providence (MP). 
Such is the method taken by free will defenders, such as Alvin Plantinga. Earlier 
we noted that the free will defender holds a free act to be significantly free under the 
following conditions: an action r is a free action if and only if the person doing r is both 
free to perform r and free to refrain from performing r; no preceding conditions and/or 
causal laws determine that he/she will perform the action or that he/she won't perform the 
action. The point pushed here by free will defenders argues that if an action is to be 
significantly free, the creature must be allowed to perform the highest possible good and 
must also be allowed to perform the most terrible evils. When God allows these terrible 
evils to be performed, the result is gratuitous evil. God could have prevented gratuitous 
acts from occurring, but in the process, he would also be restricting free choice and 
trivializing the gift of free will. The free will defenders argue that God wanted man to be 
able to freely choose to follow Him, or freely choose not to. The risk God has taken in 
preserving man's significant free will is the allowance of gratuitous evil to exist in His 
creation. If the free will defender's notion of significant free will and the denial of 
meticulous providence is accepted, then we have an answer to the evidential problem of 
gratuitous evil. 
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NATURAL EVIL 
Up to this point, much of the discussion has revolved around acts of evil, which 
are the result of man's free will. This type of evil, which stems from man's decision to 
perform them, is often called moral evil. What, then, shall we say about instances of evil 
that are not the result of man's significant free will, i.e. hurricanes, tornadoes, 
earthquakes, and so on? These natural actions often cause as much or more evil than 
moral evils do. Surely, we can hold God accountable for these evils. Free will defenders 
have taken this type of evil, natural evil, into consideration within the "Free Will 
Defense." Some within Judaism, and most within Christianity, subscribe to the belief in 
nonhuman beings or spirits. These nonhuman spirits were given the same freedom that 
man so enjoys and abuses. Some of these nonhuman spirits, Satan and his band, freely 
chose to rebel against God and the result was banishment from God's kingdom. The Old 
Testament book of Job presents Satan as an evil being whose primary domain seems to be 
the earth. While Satan's time here on Earth is limited, he exercises his free will by 
creating the evils that occur through nature. So natural evil sharply resembles moral evil 
in that it is the result of a free action by a free creature. The free will defense, then, is not 
only limited to moral evil, but applies to natural evil as well. 
REFLECTION 
This paper, as suggested by its title, is by no means an exhaustive exploration of 
the problem 0 f evil. The amount of literature written on this subject could pack the 
Library of Congress ten times over. However, what has been presented in this paper 
covers the major themes and most credible theistic responses concerning the problem of 
evil. 
Having considered these major themes, we are left with several options. One 
option is to reject the theistic defense of the plausibility of God's existence in light ofthe 
presence of evil. This route of reasoning has led many individuals to assume the 
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absurdity of evil and, more importantly, all of life in general. A second option is to 
accept the plausibility of God's existence but to deny the premise that He is both 
omnipotent or omnibenevolent; Mark Twain and Rabbi Harold Kushner, author of When 
Bad Things Happen to Good People, chose to follow this route. Finally, we can accept 
the validity of the theistic position presented thus far, and continue to look to divinely 
ordained freedom as the foundation for an acceptable theodicy. 
It is important to note that this theodicy of freedom is not going to heal the deep 
wounds that evil can inflict upon a person. Ifwe were to present the free will theodicy as 
a remedy to a young woman who had just suffered the loss of her child, she would 
certainly balk at such a proposition. What kind of God, she might ask, would allow such a 
thing to happen? What is this horrible, horrible freedom that God has given to mankind? 
In this type of situation what is needed is another person to listen and to grieve with the 
young mother. Analytical arguments and philosophical querying would only compound 
the pain that the mother was experiencing. 
Additionally, the theist adhering to the "Free Will Defense" should not propose to 
know the particular answers to the universal questions of, "Why did this happen." It must 
never be forgotten that we are operating from a finite mind when we seek the answers to 
these questions within ourselves. The monotheistic scriptures speak of a Divine being 
who does not abide by our understanding of how things are supposed to be. In fact, so 
contrary are His actions to our understanding that Mark Twain once said that if God does 
exist then He is a hideous mongrel. Instead, the role of the "Free Will Defense" is to 
defend the theistic position against the anti-theistic accusations of inconsistency. This, 
then, is accomplished with the notion of freedom. 
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